





efore discussing some conceptual shortcom-
ings of inflation targeting as a strategy for
monetary policy, it may be useful to characterise
the constitutional and macroeconomic framework
a central bank faces.The typical features of the sce-
nario envisaged here are the following:The central
bank is provided with instrument independence,
but its ultimate objective is determined externally.
At whatever institutional level this ultimate objec-
tive may be defined, it is assumed to consist in
achieving and maintaining price stability. It is fur-
ther assumed that the decision-making body of the
central bank is made up of persons of different
minds and economic policy ideas.
The principal macroeconomic constraints the cen-
tral bank faces are (1) the various lags governing
macroeconomic adjustment processes because of
limited flexibility of production, goods prices and
nominal wages, (2) the possibility of bounded
rationality of expectation formation by the public,
and (3) excess volatility of flexible exchange rates.
As regards the purely theoretical viewpoint, Lars
Svensson, in particular, has demonstrated in
numerous papers1 the overwhelming appeal of the
strategy of inflation targeting, as well as the inferi-
ority of monetary targeting. Svensson’s work is
worth mentioning because it is one of the few that
explicitly recognise the lag problem in monetary
policy making. However, the lag structure is not
the only constraint on monetary policy. An impor-
tant additional constraint is given by the fact that
neither market agents nor the central bank have
full knowledge of the ‘true’ macroeconomic model
(in theoretical analyses, this problem is simply
assumed away via the ‘rational expectations’
hypothesis).Since precisely this is the main feature
of the real world that substantially justifies a dis-
cussion of monetary policy strategy, analyses that
disregard this point are of limited value.
Because of the various lags in the transmission
process, the choice of the intermediate target is
critical. The intermediate target should enable
market participants to assess the performance of
monetary policy even in the short run. Addition-
ally, it is the main object of daily communication
between the central bank and the public. Under
inflation targeting, the forecasted inflation rate
serves as the intermediate target. This value is
based on a macroeconomic model which has to be
developed, estimated, and published by the central
bank itself. In terms of credibility and accountabil-
ity, the basic flaw of this procedure lies in the pub-
lic having to monitor monetary policy on the basis
of information which is supplied by the central
bank itself. This means that, in the short run, the
public will not be given any opportunity to com-
pare central bank announcements and actual mea-
sures with statistically objective data. Moreover,
under inflation forecast targeting the central bank
would run an additional credibility risk concerning
its performance as a forecasting agent.
In practice, it is impossible to judge current mone-
tary policy decisions by their effects on the ulti-
mate goal. This is, first, the consequence of the lag
problems. Second, actual inflation is measured as
the change of a price index in discrete time; this
statistical feature does not permit the breakdown
of price index movements into level changes and
trend changes.But price level shifts can result from
demand or supply shocks, induced by fiscal policy,
wage policy or international influences. Therefore,
the adequate assignment is to hold monetary poli-
cy responsible for the trend component alone.This
implies that, if this fact is disregarded, the concept
of inflation targeting will create an incentive for
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The final point concerns the decision making
process within the policy making body of the cen-
tral bank. Here, the strategy is of great importance
in that it serves as a kind of constitutional platform
that cannot be questioned on a case-by-case basis.
Although this is a necessary requirement for a
time-consistent monetary policy, it is not sufficient.
This is because it would be wrong to treat the pol-
icy making body as a homogenous group of indi-
viduals who are always in agreement.The possibil-
ity that some members have discretionary policy
ambitions cannot be ruled out a priori. A well-
designed strategy will help to minimise the risk of
discretionary decisions. This risk is the higher, the
more opportunities the strategy offers for debating
quantitative figures, as provided by the need to set
forecasted values for particular macroeconomic
variables or to use parameter estimates. In these
debates, discretionary policy ambitions may well
be concealed by ‘judgements’.
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